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Abstract.  The trade liberalization associated with NAFTA has affected the pattern of state
exports by altering the origin as well as the destination of merchandise exports.  We find that
NAFTA has increased US merchandise exports to Mexico and Canada by just over 15 percent,
and has increased total US merchandise exports by nearly 8 percent.  We also find that although
many states have seen large increases in exports to both Mexico and Canada, others have seen
large decreases.  NAFTA has also affected states￿ exports to non-NAFTA regions of the world,
tending to decrease exports to Europe and Latin America and increase exports to Asia.  States in
the northeast regions of the United States have seen the smallest increases in exports in the wake
of NAFTA.
JEL classification: F15, R12
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1  Introduction
Changes in trade policy have the potential to affect economic activity in regions of a country to
varying degrees.  The heated discussions preceding the passage of the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in late 1993 demonstrated vividly that potential regional changes
were a major concern of legislators.  According to Baldwin and Magee (2000), the primary
reason that some members in the US House of Representatives voted in favor of NAFTA was
their expectation that the legislation￿s effects on trade and investment flows would increase jobs
and wages in their districts.  On the other hand, they also found that the primary reason that
                                                
* We would like to acknowledge the helpful suggestions of three anonymous referees and the participants at the
October 2000 meeting of the Federal Reserve System Committee on Regional Analysis, especially Myriam Quispe-
Agnoli. We would also like to thank Ling Wang for research assistance.  The views expressed are those of the
authors and do not necessarily represent official positions of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis or of the Federal
Reserve System.2
many other House members voted against NAFTA was their expectation that passage would
result in fewer jobs and lower wages.
1
Regardless of whether one￿s primary interest is in NAFTA￿s effects on local jobs, as a
politician might be, or in its effects on welfare, as an economist would likely be, any analysis of
state or regional effects of NAFTA must begin with its effects on trade volumes.  To this end,
our analysis makes an initial assessment of the differential effects of NAFTA on merchandise
exports across US states.
2  We find, not surprisingly, that the relative price and other changes
set in motion by NAFTA had different effects across states.
3  These different effects likely reflect
the varying distributions of productive resources across regions and the substantial regional
differences in what is produced and exported.
4
We estimate a gravity model that allows assessments of not only the effects of NAFTA
on each state’s exports to Mexico and to Canada, but also on exports to Asia, Europe, and Latin
America and the Caribbean.  Few estimates of the state-level effects of NAFTA have appeared to
date.  To our knowledge, this is the first study that estimates state-level export performance with
a gravity model, a model that has become the workhorse of the international trade literature.
Ideally, we would have included state imports in our analysis, but the United States does not
                                                
1 The employment consequences of NAFTA, even at the national level, were at the center of the controversy.
Despite strong economic arguments that the employment effects for the US economy as a whole would be minimal,
these arguments were rejected by many.  In fact, as discussed by Kahane (1996), estimated employment effects
ranged from large (i.e., hundreds of thousands) job losses to large job gains.
2 To simplify our discussion, we refer to the District of Columbia as a state.
3 NAFTA, which entered into force on January 1, 1994, will lead to a phasing out of Canadian, Mexican, and US
tariffs on goods produced in North America.  Tariffs on US-Canada trade were eliminated by 1998 as part of the
1988 US-Canada Free Trade Agreement.  Tariffs on trade involving either the United States or Canada with Mexico
are to be eliminated by 2008.  Some of these tariffs were eliminated immediately, while others are being phased out
over time.  For details on these tariff changes as well as other aspects of NAFTA, see United States Trade
Representative (1997).
4 See Coughlin and Fabel (1988), Coughlin and Mandelbaum (1990), Kim (1995), and Gazel and Schwer (1998).3
collect state-level import data.
5  Nevertheless, the partial picture provided by export data
provides substantial evidence of the importance of geography on the effects of NAFTA.
Standard customs union theory predicts that integration regimes such as NAFTA lead to
increases in trade between member countries (trade creation) and decreases in trade between
members and non-members (trade diversion).  Because the distinction between countries and
regions within countries is artificial, these same predictions apply to the effects of integration on
regional trade volume ￿ NAFTA should lead a region in the United States to trade more with
Canada and Mexico and less with the rest of the world.  However, recent theoretical advances
under the label ￿new economic geography￿ suggest that the neat trade-creation/trade-diversion
dichotomy is insufficient when factor mobility is taken into account.
6  This mobility might be
between regions within a member country, or across member-country borders ￿ Ross Perot￿s
￿giant sucking sound.￿  
 One of the ways by which factor mobility makes NAFTA affect geographic trade
patterns is by expanding the spatial distributions of firms￿ customers and suppliers.  For example,
consider a firm initially located in New Jersey.  The addition of Mexico to the free trade area
expands the spatial distributions of the firm￿s customers and suppliers southward, increasing the
profitability of being closer to Mexico.  If the firm relocates, goods that had been exported to
NAFTA members from New Jersey would instead be exported from, perhaps, Arizona.  The
firm￿s relocation would also change the firm￿s position relative to non-NAFTA markets, making
it cheaper to export to Asia and more expensive to export to Europe.  State export patterns would
adjust accordingly.
                                                
5 Using Canadian provincial data, which covers imports and exports, Wall (2000) provides a partial view of the
effects of NAFTA on state imports.
6 See Gunderson (1998), Krugman (1998), and Fujita et al. (1999).4
NAFTA might also affect geographic trade patterns by expanding the set of possible
places for firms to locate.  Under NAFTA, if that firm from New Jersey moves into Mexico, it
can do so without losing tariff-free access to its domestic markets.  Thus, instead of the firm
exporting to Mexico, it exports from Mexico to New Jersey and other states.  Extra-NAFTA
trade would also be affected because the firm￿s exports would be from Mexico to the rest of the
world, rather than from New Jersey.
When these geographic effects are taken into account, the standard, unambiguous
expectations of trade creation and trade diversion no longer hold at the national or state levels.
Instead, they create the possibility that NAFTA has led to decreases in state exports to Mexico
and Canada, or to increases in state exports to non-NAFTA countries.  Indeed, we find that,
while the standard results predominated, there were sufficiently many counter-results to indicate
that geographic effects have been important in determining the effects of NAFTA on state export
patterns.
2  An overview of empirical research
Prior to discussing our analysis in detail, we briefly examine some background material to
provide some context for understanding our contribution.  We highlight, first, the different
approaches used in previous subnational export studies and, second, the emerging literature that
has attempted to estimate the effects of NAFTA.
2.1 Subnational export studies
Research on exports from US states has tended to rely on either regression or shift-share
models.
7  One group of studies, exemplified by Coughlin and Fabel (1988) and Erickson and
                                                
7 See Cronovich and Gazel (1998) and Gazel and Schwer (1998) for a discussion of subnational export research.5
Hayward (1992), is based on Heckscher-Ohlin trade models.  These supply-oriented studies,
focused on the sources of US comparative advantage, indicate that differences in state
endowments of human and physical capital contribute to differences in state export performance.
A second group of regression studies, exemplified by Erickson and Hayward (1991) and
Cronovich and Gazel (1998), focuses on the role of foreign demand in explaining subnational
export behavior.  These studies are somewhat similar to our study because they examine some of
the same determinants of export performance that appear in gravity models.  Erickson and
Hayward (1991) found that the exports of a US region are related positively to the destination
country￿s gross domestic product and negatively to the distance to the destination.  Recently,
Cronovich and Gazel (1998) found that trade-weighted exchange rates and foreign incomes were
statistically significant determinants of state exports.
8
The other common method of analyzing subnational exports, shift-share analysis, is
primarily an accounting method.  Research using this method includes Coughlin and
Mandelbaum (1990), Hayward (1995), Gazel and Schwer (1998), and Coughlin and Pollard
(2001).  Coughlin and Mandelbaum (1990) found that the industrial composition of a state￿s
exports was not a major influence on its export growth between 1976 and 1986.  Meanwhile, the
competitive effect, which the authors link to human capital, is the primary factor accounting for
state export growth.  Hayward (1995) examines the importance to US states of European trade
and discusses the possible state-level effects of European integration.  Gazel and Schwer (1998)
extended the classic shift-share model to incorporate what they classify as a demand factor, the
                                                
8 Another focus of subnational studies is the relationship between states￿ foreign involvement and growth.
Representative studies include Coughlin and Cartwright (1987), Manrique (1987), Erickson (1989), and Carlino et
al. (1994).  Coughlin and Cartwright (1987) estimate short- and long-run export elasticities of employment and find
much diversity across states.  Manrique (1987) estimates growth models and finds that those states increasing their
export orientation tended to grow faster during the 1970s than those states that did not.  Erickson (1989) also finds
that state export growth contributes to employment and value-added growth.  Finally, Carlino et al. (1994) find that
real exchange rate movements have only small effects on most states￿ growth.6
destination of a state￿s exports.  Their results suggest that this demand factor is as important as
supply conditions in explaining state export performance between 1989 and 1992.  Using Gazel
and Schwer￿s model, however, Coughlin and Pollard (2001) do not find a similar result for state
export growth between 1988 and 1998.  They find that the competitive effect dominates both the
industry mix and destination effects in accounting for a state￿s relative export performance.
9
2.2 The effects of NAFTA
Research attempting to make some preliminary assessments of the effects of NAFTA has begun.
Krueger (1999, 2000) focuses on whether this preferential trading arrangement has reduced
welfare via trade diversion rather than enhancing it via trade creation.  Using a number of
approaches, one of which is a gravity model of aggregate trade flows, she finds that the evidence
for trade creation appears to be stronger than that for trade diversion.
She stresses, however, that her conclusion is tentative.  For various reasons, it is difficult
to separate economic behavior into pre-NAFTA (i.e., prior to January 1, 1994) and post-NAFTA
periods.  First, firms and other important decisionmakers had formed expectations of NAFTA
prior to its official passage.  Presidents Bush and Salinas signed an agreement in June 1990 to
negotiate such an agreement, so it is reasonable to think that some economic actions were taken
in anticipation of passage.  Second, the agreement called for a 10-to15-year phase-in of the tariff
cuts for many commodities.  Third, NAFTA can be viewed as another step in the process of
Mexican trade liberalization.  For example, Hinojosa-Ojeda et al. (2000) found that Mexico’s
unilateral trade liberalization, begun in the mid-1980s, stimulated a substantial increase in the
                                                
9 Gazel and Schwer (1998) discuss two other shift-share studies   Markusen et al. (1991) and Hayward and
Erickson (1995)   that are relevant to understanding the determinants and effects of subnational trade flows.7
two-way trade of manufactured intermediate goods that has continued and matured during
NAFTA’s existence.
More recently, Romalis (2001) concludes that NAFTA has had a substantial positive
effect on Canadian and Mexican shares of US imports, particularly in the industries with the
largest relative tariff reductions.  Romalis concludes, though, that because NAFTA led to no
increase in overall imports, the increase in imports from Canada and Mexico were at the expense
of imports from the rest of the world.
Several studies using various methodologies have estimated the effect of NAFTA on
trade and investment flows and, in turn, how these flows have affected employment and
earnings.
10  In addition, some work has been done to estimate the partial equilibrium effects of
NAFTA at the industry level.
11  Generally speaking, these studies have paid scant attention to the
differing regional effects of NAFTA.
12  Nevertheless, given the disparity in states￿ comparative
advantages and proximity to trading partners, there is every reason to believe that the state-level
effects of NAFTA would be far from uniform.  Also, because NAFTA set in motion changes in
the United States￿ trading relationship with not only Mexico and Canada, but also with the rest of
the world, it is likely that the existing estimates capture only some of NAFTA’s effects.  Thus, a
more general approach to capture a broader geographic range of effects might generate results
that are more meaningful.  Research by Wall (2000) exemplifies one such approach.
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12 Exceptions include Scott (1999) and Rothstein and Scott (1997), who try to discern state employment effects
from changes in aggregate bilateral trade deficits ￿ a dubious yet common approach (Hinojosa-Ojeda et al., 2000,
p. 6).  State employment effects were also estimated by Bolle (2000), whose estimates of job losses depend on
certifications under the Department of Labor’s NAFTA-Transitional Adjustment Assistance program.  Hinojosa-
Ojeda et al. (2000, p. 62) cite several ways in which the numbers from this program mis-state the number of actual
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Using data on Canadian provincial trade, Wall uses a gravity model to estimate the
effects of NAFTA on the geographic pattern of North American trade.  Specifically, he looks at
the effects of NAFTA on trade flows between subnational regions within North America and
between North American regions and the non-NAFTA world.  Although most of the estimated
effects are consistent with standard customs union theory ￿ increased trade between members
of NAFTA and decreased trade between members of NAFTA and non-members ￿ many are
not.  For example, Wall found that NAFTA led to decreased trade between Eastern Canada and
much of North America and to increased trade between Mexico and Asia.
Similar to Wall (2000), our analysis is of the effect of NAFTA on the geographic pattern
of trade.  However, our analysis is from the perspective of US states and estimates the effects of
NAFTA on their exports to Mexico, Canada, and major regions of the world.
3  The empirical model
As with the majority of recent work on the effects of international integration on aggregate trade
volumes, we use a gravity model to estimate the effects of NAFTA.  Gravity models of
international trade were pioneered by Tinbergen (1962), P￿yh￿nen (1963), and Linnemann
(1966).  In gravity models, the volume of trade is estimated as an increasing function of the
national incomes of the trading partners and a decreasing function of the distance between them.
In these simple models, the effects of integration are estimated by including dummy variables to
indicate shifts in the gravity equation following integration.  Because of its simplicity and
empirical success, the model has subsequently become a workhorse of the empirical trade
literature.  Further, because it is a general equilibrium model, it does not suffer from the well-
known defects of partial equilibrium studies.9
The major practical advantage of the gravity model is that it does not require one to
specify the complicated processes underlying trade flows.  On the other hand, despite its
empirical usefulness, the fact that it is largely ad hoc means that it has been treated with some
suspicion by international trade theorists.  Nonetheless, Deardorff (1984, p. 504) concluded that
gravity models ￿tell us something very important about what happens in international trade, even
if they do not tell us why.￿  More recently, papers by Bergstrand (1985, 1989) and Deardorff
(1998), among others, demonstrate that the gravity model can be derived within a variety of
standard theoretical frameworks.  In fact, according to Frankel (1998, p. 2), the gravity model
has ￿gone from an embarrassing poverty of theoretical foundations to an embarrassment of
riches.￿
Our study relies on state-level merchandise export data for all 50 states and the District of
Columbia to most countries in the world.  The data are prepared by the Massachusetts Institute
for Social and Economic Research (MISER) at the University of Massachusetts-Amherst.  The
MISER data are export shipments by state of origin of movement to various destinations
throughout the world.  Although this data set is regarded as the best available source for state
export data, it has well-known weaknesses ￿ the most important of which arise from the
differences between the origin of movement and the origin of production ￿ which have been
discussed in Cronovich and Gazel (1999), Hayward and Erickson (1995), and Coughlin and
Mandelbaum (1991).
While the potential problems with the MISER data are well documented, it is very
difficult to measure the extent to which they matter.  In examining the MISER series, Cronovich
and Gazel (1999) compare with to the Census Bureau￿s AR series (Exports from Manufacturing
Establishments) ￿ which they regard as the series that best indicates the origin of production ￿
that was published only for the period 1987 to 1992.  They conclude that for most states, the10
MISER series is ￿an acceptably close substitute for the AR series￿ for the period.  The eight
(mostly small) states that do not satisfy their criteria are the District of Columbia, Montana,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Tennessee, and Vermont.
We include 32 destination countries in our data set: Canada, Mexico, and the top ten US
export destinations in each of Europe, Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean (excluding
Mexico).
13  We complete our data set with gross domestic product (GDP) data from the World
Bank, gross state product (GSP) data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, and the consumer
price index from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  We have complete data for the years 1988 to
1997, providing us with 16,320 observations.
Such a large data set provides substantial freedom to disaggregate the effects of NAFTA.
To exploit this opportunity, we created 255 separate dummy variables to capture NAFTA￿s
effects on every state￿s exports to each of Canada, Mexico, and three non-North American
continents.
14  Our gravity model is standard, except that, following MÆtyÆs (1997), Bayoumi and
Eichengreen (1997), Baier and Bergstrand (2001), and Cheng and Wall (2001), we allow the
intercept to differ across trading partners.  The following heterogeneous gravity equation,
modified as noted below, is estimated by least squares:
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where xijt is real exports from state i to country j in year t,  0 α  is the portion of the intercept
common to all state-country pairs,  ij α  is the pair-specific portion of the intercept, Yit is the real
                                                
13 These countries are: Europe: the United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands, France, Belgium, Italy,
Switzerland, Spain, Ireland, and Sweden; Asia: Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong, China, Malaysia,
Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia, and Vietnam; Latin America and the Caribbean: Brazil, Venezuela, Colombia,
Argentina, Chile, Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, Peru, Guatemala, and Jamaica.  Taiwan is not included because
the World Bank does not provide GDP data for it.
14 For simplicity, we refer to Latin America and the Caribbean as a continent.11
GSP of state i in year t, Yjt is the real GDP of country j in year t, and Dij is the distance between
state i and country j.  Note that because some observations of state exports are zero, our
dependent variable is the log of 1 plus exports.  Censoring of this sort normally requires Tobit
estimation, but doing so would mean losing the double-log relationship inherent to the gravity
model.  Our approach preserves the double-log form while approximating Tobit results
(Eichengreen and Irwin, 1998).
Exports from state i to country j also depend on other factors ￿ contiguity, common
language, and historical or cultural links ￿ that are usually included in gravity models.  In (1),
their effect on trade volume is  ij Z ω ′ = α ij , where Zij is a vector of fixed factors that make the
volume of exports from i to j differ from the average.  This is the only difference between our
heterogeneous gravity model and the traditional homogeneous one, which imposes the restriction
that  0 = α ij  for all pairs of i and j.  Notice that  ij ij D ln   and   δ α  cannot be separated in the
estimation because they are perfectly collinear.  Thus, we estimate their sum as a fixed effect,
ij ij ij D ln δ + α = π .  The fixed effects are estimated using a dummy variable for each of our
1,683 state-country pairs.
15  A state-country dummy takes the value of 1 whenever the
observation is of exports from the state to the country, and is 0 otherwise.
Using fixed effects estimation allows us to capture the influence of not only distance and
other fixed variables normally specified in gravity models, but also of any number of important
factors that may be difficult or impossible to quantify and which are, therefore, normally
excluded.  As shown by MÆtyÆs (1997), Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997), and Cheng and Wall
(2001), excluding these variables, which is the same as restricting their effects to be the same
                                                
15 Note that we count pre- and post-unification Germany as two different countries, making our panel data set
unbalanced, without 1988-90 observations for unified Germany or 1991-97 observations for West Germany.12
across states and countries, results in serious estimation bias.
16  Also, because we do not have to
measure distance ￿ it is subsumed into the fixed effect ￿ we avoid having to choose one of the
ad hoc measures of distance normally used, while still controlling for the effects of distance on
trade volume.
Another potential benefit of fixed effects estimation is that it may allow us to control for
estimation bias resulting from the potentially large divergence between the MISER data and
exports based on the origin of movement.  This is because the fixed effect term would pick up
any proportional divergence between the two series that is consistent over the sample.  In this
case, the divergence would be just like any other unobserved pair-specific heterogeneity, as it
would be controlled for with the pair-specific fixed effects.
We estimate the effects of NAFTA and overseas integration on the exports of the 51
states.  The percentage effects of NAFTA are approximated by the coefficients on a state￿s five
state-to-continent dummy variables: 
sc
ijt NAFTA  is equal to 1 when the observation is of exports
from state s to a country in continent c in a year after and including 1994, and is 0 otherwise.
NAFTA was not the only regional integration agreement that happened during our
sample period that could have affected North American trading patterns.  The European
Community (EC) reduced most internal barriers in 1993 when it became the European Union
(EU); and Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay formed the Southern Cone Common
Market (Mercosur) in 1995.  To control for the effects of these overseas regime changes on US
state exports to EU and Mercosur members, we include state-specific dummy variables for both.
The dummy 
s
ijt EU  takes the value of 1 when the observation is of state s exporting to an EU
                                                
16 Rather than using dummy variables, we could control for fixed effects by using the first differences of the
variables.  However, this approach is not appropriate in the present case because it would place arbitrary restrictions
on our estimates of the trend effect (Cheng and Wall 2001).13




ijt MERC  is equal to 1 beginning in 1995 when the observation is of state s
exporting to Argentina or Brazil, the two Mercosur countries in our sample.  The parameters
associated with the EU and Mercosur dummies approximate the estimated percentage effects of
the regimes on a state￿s exports.
Although not controlled for with a separate variable, our estimation also accounts for the
effects of exchange rate changes, such as those following the Mexican peso crisis of 1995, by
using market exchange rates to convert variables into dollars.  In the spirit of gravity models, this
means that the economic size of a country, as measured by GDP, changes along with the value of
its currency.
18,19
We also include a trend variable, t, that is common to all trading pairs and captures the
changes in trade volume that would have occurred even if there were no new regional trading
regimes and no changes in income levels.  In this sense, the coefficient on the time trend
indicates the percentage change in trade due to ￿globalization,￿ here defined as an inherent
common trend toward increased international trade.   Finally,  ijt ε  is the random error term.
4  Empirical results
Tables 1a-c contain the results of our least squares estimation.  As expected in gravity models,
the coefficients on the incomes of states and countries are positive and statistically significant.
The coefficient on the trend variable is positive and statistically significant and indicates that
                                                
17 Note also that EUijt is equals to 1 for Sweden beginning in 1994, when, as a member of the European Free
Trade Area, it began enjoying equal access to EU markets.
18 Note that it has become common in recent versions of the gravity model to use exchange rates measured
according to purchasing power parity rather than market value.  However, for trading purposes, the relevant measure
of a country￿s economy is not its worth for domestic purchases, but its worth for international purchases.
19 See Cronovich and Gazel (1998) for an alternative treatment of exchange rates in a model of state exports.14
globalization was responsible for an increase in state exports of 3.2 percent per year.  Also, as
Figure 1 illustrates, the residuals are reasonably well behaved, especially when compared with
those generated by homogeneous gravity models.  As demonstrated by Cheng and Wall (2001),
plots of residuals generated by homogeneous gravity models indicate a strong tendency to
underestimate high levels of trade and to overestimate low levels of trade.
Other than the effects of NAFTA, our most interesting results are our estimates of the
effects of the EU and Mercosur on state exports.  These are provided by Table 1b and are
illustrated by Figures 2 and 3.  Standard theory suggests that these customs unions would lead
their members to divert their imports from non-member producers, such as the United States,
toward other member countries.  Thus, one would expect negative signs for our EU and
Mercosur coefficients.  However, we find that, while the change from the EC to the EU reduced
total US exports to EU members by just over 24 percent, the formation of Mercosur increased
total US exports to Mercosur members by nearly 29 percent.
20  The most likely explanation for
this rather anomalous result is that the formation of Mercosur coincided with fairly dramatic
liberalization of the economies of the member countries, including the relaxation of trade
restrictions.
The effects of the EU and Mercosur were not uniform across states.  There were three
states ￿ Idaho, Maryland, and Wyoming ￿ for which the EU led to large increases (10% or
greater) in exports to EU members; there were 14 other states for which the effect of the EU was
small (less than 10% in either direction).  Thus, for 34 states, the effect of the EU was a large
decline in exports to EU members.  All but one of the 27 statistically significant EU effects were
negative.
                                                
20 Throughout, the aggregate effects are calculated using 1997 exports to weight the state-level effects.15
As for the effects of Mercosur, there were 13 states (concentrated in the Northeast and
Northwest) that saw large decreases in exports to Mercosur members in the wake of that
agreement.  The effect of Mercosur was small for only six states and was large and positive for
32 states.  Moreover, of the 31 statistically significant Mercosur effects, 29 were positive.
 Our estimates of the 255 state-level NAFTA dummies, which approximate the
percentage change in exports, are presented in Table 1c   153 (102) possess positive (negative)
signs, with 48 percent being statistically significant.  These estimates are illustrated by maps in
Figures 4 through 9.  Table 1c also provides the estimated effects of NAFTA aggregated for each
state across continents and for each continent across states.  Table 2 presents the results
aggregated to the regional level.  Our results indicate that the effects of NAFTA were often
contrary to the neat predictions of standard customs union theory.  For example, while we find
that at the aggregate level NAFTA led to increases of over 15 percent in US exports to Mexico
and Canada, its effects on exports to non-NAFTA regions of the world were more complex.
21
Exports to Europe fell by almost 6 percent, exports to Asia rose by 15 percent, and there was a
small negative effect of roughly 3 percent on exports to Latin America and the Caribbean.
As discussed in more detail below, the effects of NAFTA differed a great deal at the state
and regional levels.  For most states, the effects of NAFTA mirrored the increase in total US
exports to Mexico and Canada, although to widely varying degrees.  Perhaps more interesting,
though, is our finding that many states have seen NAFTA lead to decreased exports to Mexico
and Canada.  Similarly, for extra-NAFTA exports the aggregate effects of NAFTA mask a rich
variety of state and regional effects that were often counter to standard theoretical predictions.
                                                
21 Despite the difficulty of making a straightforward comparison, our estimate of the overall effect of NAFTA on
exports to Mexico is similar to one generated by Gould (1998).  Our point estimate of NAFTA￿s effect on US
exports to Canada exceeds Gould￿s; however, Gould characterizes his estimate as very imprecise.16
NAFTA￿s effects on state exports to Mexico were not highly correlated with its effects on
state exports to Canada.  The simple correlation of 0.04 suggests that state exports to the two
countries did not tend to be affected similarly by NAFTA.  For extra-NAFTA exports, the
various effects were similarly unrelated.  Simple correlations between NAFTA￿s effects on state
exports to Latin America and the Caribbean and on state exports to Europe as well as Asia are
only 0.16 and 0.05, respectively.  Also, the simple correlation of -0.04 between the effects of
NAFTA on Asia and Europe suggests that these effects were also unrelated.
The only relationships between different NAFTA effects that we detect are for the effects
on exports to both Canada and Mexico with the effect on exports to Latin America.  The
correlation coefficient between the effects for Mexico and Latin America is 0.34, which is
statistically significant at the 1 percent level.  Similarly, the correlation coefficient between the
effects for Canada and Latin America is 0.22, which is significant at the 12 percent level.  Thus,
if NAFTA had a positive effect on a state￿s exports to Canada or Mexico, it also tended to have a
positive effect on the state￿s exports to Latin America and the Caribbean.
4.1 Intra-NAFTA state and regional exports
Our estimates of the state-level effects of NAFTA on US exports to Mexico and Canada are
listed in Table 1c and are illustrated by Figures 4 and 5.  While we find that 28 states had their
exports to Mexico increase by more than 10 percent because of NAFTA, we also find that eight
states had decreases of greater than 10 percent.  About two-thirds of these estimated changes,
both positive and negative, were statistically significant.  At the regional level (see Table 2), six
of the nine regions of the United States experienced positive NAFTA effects of between 11 and
22 percent on exports to Mexico.  The Southeast stood out, though, with a NAFTA effect of 32
percent driven by large effects for Virginia and the Carolinas.  For the Plains the effect of17
NAFTA on exports to Mexico was a rather modest 6.5 percent, while the Mideast, primarily
reflecting a large negative effect on exports from New York, was the only region for which
NAFTA led to a decrease in exports to Mexico.
Positive state-level effects of NAFTA on exports to Canada were widespread: 36 states
had positive NAFTA effects of 10 percent or higher, and the effects tended to be statistically
significant.  Nevertheless, there were four states whose exports to Canada fell by more than 10
percent in the wake of NAFTA.  At the regional level, though, NAFTA increased the exports to
Canada for all nine regions, although the increases for the Great Lakes and Rocky Mountain
regions were rather modest.  For the Great Lakes, the regional number was dragged down by the
large negative effect for Michigan, the only state in the region for which NAFTA did not lead to
a large increase in exports to Canada.
Although our finding that NAFTA increased total US exports to Canada by 15 percent is
very similar to the 13 percent increase found by Wall (2000), our estimates of the regional
effects of NAFTA differ a great deal from his estimates.  In particular, he finds a large increase
(21 percent) in exports from the Great Lakes region to Canada, whereas we find a much more
modest increase.  Also, he finds small increases in exports from the Plains and Southwest to
Canada (6 percent for each), whereas we find increases of 23 and 30 percent, respectively.  His
region-level results are not directly comparable to ours, however, as Canadian provincial trade
data uses the Census Bureau￿s ￿origin of movement￿ method to assign states of origin, without
adjustments of the sort performed by MISER.
4.2 Extra-NAFTA state and regional exports
Our estimates of the effects of NAFTA on US state exports to Europe, Asia, and Latin America
and the Caribbean are listed in their respective columns of Table 1c and are illustrated by Figures18
6, 7, and 8.  The estimates aggregated to the regional level are listed in Table 2.  We found that
the 6 percent NAFTA-induced decrease in total US exports to Europe was regionally
concentrated, and only 14 of the state-level effects were statistically significant.  The Far West
and the Mideast both saw NAFTA lead to large decreases in exports to Europe.  For the Far West
this was dominated by Washington￿s NAFTA effect of -25 percent, while it was New York￿s
NAFTA effect of -19 percent that drove down the number for the Mideast.  In contrast, the
Rocky Mountain region saw a somewhat large increase in exports to Europe, driven by a
NAFTA effect of 32 percent for Utah.
Similar to the effects of NAFTA on exports to Europe, its effect on US exports to Asia
was far from uniform across states and regions.  In contrast to the effects on exports to Europe,
the effects of NAFTA on state exports to Asia were spread across the regions, and the state-level
effects are statistically significant for 30 states.  There were 22 states with NAFTA effects
greater than 10 percent, and eight with negative NAFTA effects of 10 percent or more.
However, this left 21 states with small NAFTA effects, split nearly evenly between positives and
negatives.  NAFTA led to increases in exports to Asia for most regions, although the increase for
the Southeast was fairly small.  NAFTA had a very small effect on exports from the Mideast to
Europe, although the large positive effect for Maryland was cancelled out by the negatives for
other states in the region.  Similarly, New England￿s small negative effect would have been even
more negative if Vermont had not had its 46 percent boost from NAFTA.
As with the effects of NAFTA on exports to Europe and Asia, there were interesting state
and regional differences in the effects on exports to Latin America and the Caribbean.  Despite a
small aggregate effect, we found 21 states for which NAFTA led to large decreases in exports to
Latin America, compared with only eight for which it led to large increases.  For 25 states the
effect was statistically significant.  The regional characteristics of the effect of NAFTA on US19
exports to Latin America and the Caribbean is clear from Figure 8.  Large negative effects were
concentrated in the states in the far North of the United States ￿ there were decreases of 16
percent for exports from the Mideast and New England.  In contrast, the large state-level
increases in exports to Latin America following NAFTA were concentrated in the two southern
regions.
4.3 Total state and regional exports
As discussed above, NAFTA has had many different effects on exports from the states and
regions of the United States.  It has not only affected the flow of trade from the United States to
its NAFTA partners, but also to non-NAFTA parts of the world.  An evaluation of the state,
regional, and national effects of NAFTA on trade volumes would be incomplete without adding
its effects on extra-NAFTA exports.  The last column of Table 1c provides the aggregated
estimates of the effects of NAFTA on total state exports, which are illustrated by Figure 9 and
are aggregated to the regional level in the last column of Table 5.
The nearly 8 percent estimated boost in US exports from NAFTA was spread across the
states and regions.  Of the 12 states with estimated negative effects, only three had decreases of
greater than 10 percent.  These are Mississippi (-14 percent), the District of Columbia (-15
percent), and Delaware (-13 percent).  Of the 39 states whose total exports increased, 27 saw
increases in excess of 10 percent.  The states with the largest positive effects were New Mexico
(37 percent), Kentucky (35 percent), Colorado (29 percent), Indiana (26 percent), and 8 others
who had their exports expand by more than 20 percent.
States either on the Canadian border or on the northern section of the Eastern Seaboard
tended to have experienced small NAFTA effects.  At the regional level, although the total
effects of NAFTA on total exports were all positive, the increases for New England and the20
Mideast were very small, with the latter being indistinguishable from zero.  The estimated effects
of NAFTA on the total exports for the other seven regions were all between 9 and 16 percent.
4.4 NAFTA and state growth
A review of the dynamic effects of trade liberalization by the US International Trade
Commission (1997b) indicates much theoretical support for expecting trade liberalization to have
a positive effect on economic growth.  In the context of NAFTA, the literature suggests that
those states with more positive export effects should have experienced relatively more rapid
growth.  To explore this hypothesis, as well as to generate some information concerning how
reasonable our results are, we calculated simple correlations between state income growth
between 1993 and 1998 and our estimates of the effects of NAFTA on total exports.  The simple
correlation of 0.38, which is statistically significant at the better than the 1 percent level, suggests
that states with more pronounced NAFTA-related export effects also tended to grow faster.
In addition, we explored the connection between state income growth and our estimates
of the effects of NAFTA on exports to specific regions.  The simple correlation was virtually
zero using the estimated export effects for both Mexico (-0.06) and Canada (0.05).  A similar
result was found for exports to Latin America and the Caribbean (0.12).  Meanwhile, state
income growth was correlated at better than the 10 percent significance level only with the
estimated NAFTA effects on state exports to Europe (0.37) and Asia (0.25).  Clearly, though,
these results are only suggestive of the possible role that NAFTA may have played in
determining state growth, and they are far from conclusive.  Our simple correlations do not
account for the simultaneity of exports and income, nor do they control for potential covariates
that might explain changes in exports and changes in income.21
Recent theoretical work suggests the possibility that international integration can affect
the regional concentration of economic activities.  In Krugman and Livas (1996), giant
metropolises in the third world are the unintended consequence of import protection, so trade
liberalization will lead to a dispersal of some activity out of metropolises.
22  In contrast, in
Paluzie (2001), because of agglomeration effects, trade liberalization by a country with
interregional labor mobility leads to a greater concentration of economic activity.  Our results do
not offer any evidence that NAFTA￿s effects were related to the initial pattern of economic
activity.  Specifically, the rank correlation between 1993 state per capita income and our
estimates of the effects of NAFTA on state exports is -0.18, indicating a tendency for poorer
states to have seen larger NAFTA effects.  With a t-statistic of -1.29, though, this relationship is
not statistically different from zero.
5  Conclusions
Our gravity model estimation generates numerous results concerning the effects of NAFTA on
exports at the state level; however, our analysis also produces other noteworthy results.  As
expected in gravity models, we find that economic size matters ― the incomes of states and
destination countries are positive and statistically significant determinants of state exports.  This
is consistent with Erickson and Hayward (1991) and Cronovich and Gazel (1998), who find that
state export flows are positively related to the GDPs of destination countries.  We also find that
globalization was responsible for a 3.2 percent increase in yearly state exports and that,
according to our fixed effects estimates, many other factors ― including distance and any
number of unobservable pair-specific factors ― matter as well.
                                                
22 Wei and Wu (2001) find that urban-rural inequality was lower for Chinese cities that were more open to trade.22
Existing estimates of the effect of NAFTA on aggregate US trade are rather lukewarm.
Krueger (1999, 2000) finds no statistically significant effects, but concludes that the increase in
trade with Mexico and Canada probably was larger than the decrease in trade with the rest of the
world.  Looking only at US imports, Romalis (2001) finds that the increase in imports from
Mexico and Canada due to NAFTA has been at the expense of imports from the rest of the
world, for a net decrease in US imports.
In contrast, we find that NAFTA had large and significant effects on US merchandise
exports.  We find that US exports to Mexico and Canada increased by 16 and 15 percent,
respectively, while exports to Europe and Latin America decreased by 6 and 3 percent,
respectively.  In contrast with the standard trade creation/diversion dichotomy, we also find that
NAFTA led to a 15 percent increase in exports to Asia.  Overall, our results indicate that
NAFTA has led to an 8 percent increase in yearly US exports.
NAFTA has also had wide-ranging state-level effects on merchandise exports.  Most
states saw increased total exports: 13 saw increases of 20 percent or more while another 12 saw
increases between 12 and 20 percent.  The effect of NAFTA on total exports was negative for 12
states, with three states seeing decreases of 10 percent or more.
This study has also generated results concerning NAFTA￿s effects on the relative
importance of NAFTA members as recipients of state exports.  As with the United States as a
whole, most states saw large increases in exports to both Mexico and Canada, although there
were significant differences across states.  In particular, we find that, as a result of NAFTA, eight
states saw large decreases in their exports to Mexico, while four states saw large decreases in
their exports to Canada.  As suggested by the new economic geography literature, these state-
level decreases in intra-NAFTA exports highlight the importance of firm mobility in determining
the effects of international integration on the pattern of state exports.23
It is not only state exports to Canada and Mexico that have been affected by NAFTA, but
also state exports to the non-NAFTA world.  These effects varied greatly across states and
destinations, and there was no consistent pattern of positive or negative effects.  Also noteworthy
is our finding that states￿ NAFTA effects have not tended to be very similar across the various
export destinations.
 The wide variety of state-level NAFTA effects suggests that, consistent with Coughlin
and Fabel (1988) and Erickson and Hayward (1992), the distribution of states￿ productive
resources plays a role in determining the geographic distribution of the effects of NAFTA.  In
addition, the fact that we found so many positive NAFTA effects (contrary to the usual negative
trade diversion effects) indicates that the geographic mobility of firms has also likely been an
important factor in determining the post-NAFTA pattern of exports.  At this stage of our
research, though, we are unable to separate the state-level NAFTA effects into their constituent
parts.
  In light of these results, estimation approaches such as the gravity model, that
simultaneously account for the many different effects of integration, are essential to
understanding how NAFTA has altered the pattern of state exports.  Moreover, the great
diversity of results across states and regions indicates the importance of geographic and
subnational considerations in the evaluation of international integration.24
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Log of gross state product 0.661* 5.593
Log of gross domestic product 0.475* 20.385
Trend 0.032* 10.396
EU and Mercosur dummies see Table 1b
NAFTA dummies see Table 1c
2 R 0.964
F(360,14277) 31.60
Number of observations 16,320
* indicates statistical significance at the 10% level using White-corrected
standard errors.
a Estimates of the 1,683 state-country fixed effects are suppressed for space
considerations.28
Table 1b. Estimated effects of overseas integration on state exports
European Union    Mercosur
State Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat.
Alabama -0.217 * -3.051 0.226 1.501
Alaska -0.497 * -3.732 0.370 * 1.728
Arizona -0.025 -0.201 0.227 1.099
Arkansas 0.054 0.458 0.656 * 3.789
California -0.143 * -2.535 0.219 * 1.770
Colorado -0.102 -1.261 0.424 * 2.616
Connecticut -0.160 * -1.658 0.112 0.759
Delaware -0.082 -0.433 0.290 * 1.663
Dist. of Columbia -0.155 -0.601 -0.328 * -1.732
Florida -0.277 * -5.354 0.556 * 3.656
Georgia -0.186 * -1.970 0.760 * 3.817
Hawaii -0.386 * -4.195 0.316 1.465
Idaho 0.224 * 1.870 0.365 * 2.414
Illinois -0.036 -0.551 0.456 * 3.608
Indiana -0.068 -1.077 0.319 * 2.266
Iowa -0.162 * -1.920 0.682 * 3.956
Kansas -0.203 * -2.789 0.265 1.099
Kentucky -0.469 * -4.845 0.154 1.127
Louisiana -0.160 * -2.891 0.219 1.233
Maine -0.203 * -2.618 -0.108 -0.513
Maryland 0.169 1.361 0.215 * 1.767
Massachusetts -0.216 * -4.293 0.301 * 2.935
Michigan -0.148 -1.405 0.220 * 1.707
Minnesota -0.126 * -1.773 0.253 * 2.487
Mississippi -0.321 * -2.964 0.098 0.398
Missouri -0.557 * -3.155 0.350 * 2.291
Montana -0.272 * -2.324 0.210 * 1.676
Nebraska -0.067 -0.576 0.699 * 3.452
Nevada -0.443 * -2.977 0.252 * 2.732
New Hampshire -0.176 -1.097 0.073 0.419
New Jersey -0.217 * -4.276 0.265 * 2.393
New Mexico 0.052 0.345 -0.610 * -1.858
New York -0.249 * -2.451 -0.058 -0.620
North Carolina -0.263 * -3.201 0.524 * 3.994
North Dakota -0.044 -0.382 0.517 * 4.447
Ohio -0.103 -1.503 0.488 * 4.593
Oklahoma -0.185 -1.293 0.242 * 1.772
Oregon 0.003 0.023 0.072 0.568
Pennsylvania -0.044 -0.647 -0.152 -1.022
Rhode Island -0.120 -0.978 0.188 0.708
South Carolina -0.002 -0.024 0.557 * 3.309
South Dakota 0.041 0.264 -0.153 -1.326
Tennessee 0.004 0.054 0.547 * 4.636
Texas -0.236 * -4.065 0.440 * 6.492
Utah -0.116 -0.598 -0.212 -0.867
Vermont -0.010 -0.061 -0.050 -0.186
Virginia -0.413 * -4.585 -0.041 -0.333
Washington -0.633 * -3.053 -0.235 -0.557
West Virginia -0.317 * -2.303 0.240 * 3.041
Wisconsin -0.173 * -3.687 0.451 * 3.034
Wyoming 0.101 0.544 0.360 1.126
US Total -0.244 0.287
       * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level using White-
       corrected standard errors.29
Table 1c. Estimated effects of NAFTA on state exports
     Mexico     Canada    Europe    Asia    Latin America World
State Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat. Coeff. t-stat.      Total
Alabama 0.439 * 1.680 0.351 * 5.462 -0.015 -0.216 -0.246 * -3.804 0.147 * 1.681 0.121
Alaska 0.551 1.488 0.354 * 1.705 0.105 0.788 -0.009 -0.078 -0.220 * -2.476 0.036
Arizona 0.209 * 2.042 0.232 * 2.442 0.088 0.720 0.348 * 4.198 -0.240 * -2.693 0.225
Arkansas 0.338 * 1.874 0.356 * 4.251 -0.193 * -1.673 0.098 1.120 0.052 0.576 0.179
California 0.202 * 3.357 0.245 * 4.355 -0.028 -0.475 0.330 * 4.512 0.046 0.628 0.212
Colorado 0.123 0.899 0.172 1.635 0.066 0.897 0.590 * 7.231 0.032 0.512 0.285
Connecticut 0.115 1.556 0.145 1.515 0.083 0.903 -0.106 -1.639 -0.145 -1.488 0.042
Delaware 0.406 * 2.677 -0.603 * -4.374 0.134 0.623 0.091 1.460 0.166 * 2.011 -0.125
Dist. of Columbia -0.029 -0.119 0.422 1.062 -0.407 * -1.715 -0.091 -0.634 -0.188 * -2.705 -0.150
Florida -0.102 * -1.746 -0.062 -1.051 -0.089 * -1.921 0.032 0.339 -0.042 -0.852 -0.044
Georgia 0.159 1.474 0.262 * 1.989 0.024 0.234 0.300 * 4.266 0.034 0.460 0.163
Hawaii -0.229 -0.399 -0.308 * -3.558 0.013 0.177 -0.069 -0.532 -0.312 * -10.701 -0.082
Idaho -0.213 -1.631 0.094 1.464 -0.143 -1.192 0.418 * 3.497 -0.372 * -6.118 0.152
Illinois 0.070 0.640 0.225 * 3.420 -0.118 * -1.686 0.373 * 5.288 0.187 * 3.211 0.165
Indiana 0.036 0.343 0.428 * 6.021 0.093 1.566 0.079 1.125 0.003 0.044 0.259
Iowa 0.272 * 2.974 0.241 * 3.663 0.057 0.662 0.180 * 2.944 0.066 0.913 0.167
Kansas 0.033 0.281 0.420 * 3.934 -0.056 -0.792 0.273 * 3.312 0.014 0.134 0.219
Kentucky 0.080 0.831 0.620 * 6.444 0.108 1.152 0.146 * 2.496 0.437 * 3.855 0.354
Louisiana -0.113 -0.769 0.097 1.052 -0.132 * -2.303 0.240 * 3.032 0.044 0.694 0.063
Maine -0.100 -0.920 0.103 * 2.428 -0.026 -0.343 -0.025 -0.330 -0.179 * -2.796 0.018
Maryland 0.031 0.260 -0.003 -0.029 -0.309 * -2.582 0.495 * 6.572 0.033 0.415 0.003
Massachusetts 0.137 * 1.712 0.239 * 2.404 -0.049 -1.030 -0.084 * -1.683 -0.149 * -2.689 0.012
Michigan 0.326 1.217 -0.161 * -2.377 -0.135 -1.411 0.143 * 2.718 -0.010 -0.171 -0.036
Minnesota -0.219 * -4.308 0.214 * 3.391 -0.064 -1.050 0.169 * 2.339 -0.253 * -4.130 0.084
Mississippi 0.073 0.461 -0.044 -0.891 -0.111 -1.019 -0.216 * -2.361 -0.321 * -2.625 -0.137
Missouri 0.043 0.514 0.181 0.950 0.346 * 1.992 0.020 0.329 -0.031 -0.520 0.165
Montana 0.541 * 1.778 -0.057 -0.839 0.181 1.560 -0.238 * -2.409 -0.369 * -10.941 0.000
Nebraska 0.644 * 3.825 0.276 * 3.403 -0.107 -1.059 0.194 * 2.699 -0.077 -1.129 0.215
Nevada -0.794 * -3.560 0.382 * 1.960 0.317 * 1.951 -0.033 -0.444 -0.198 * -2.872 0.242
New Hampshire 0.334 * 4.030 0.141 1.591 -0.147 -0.902 -0.107 -1.369 -0.353 * -4.536 -0.02230
New Jersey -0.011 -0.136 0.206 * 1.975 -0.091 * -2.019 -0.004 -0.072 -0.081 -1.378 0.020
New Mexico 0.628 * 3.526 -0.095 * -1.874 -0.139 -0.851 0.439 * 2.321 -0.265 * -3.182 0.372
New York -0.193 * -1.800 0.262 * 2.895 -0.190 * -1.989 -0.093 -1.296 -0.304 * -4.488 -0.029
North Carolina 0.776 * 6.344 0.428 * 5.090 0.072 0.901 -0.083 -1.563 0.200 * 2.950 0.214
North Dakota 0.181 0.385 0.102 1.181 0.057 0.585 -0.201 * -3.975 -0.269 * -4.834 0.073
Ohio 0.050 0.741 0.200 * 3.401 -0.117 -1.609 0.089 * 2.013 0.055 0.917 0.106
Oklahoma 0.292 * 1.974 -0.071 -0.999 -0.127 -0.985 0.154 * 1.856 0.144 1.603 0.020
Oregon 0.245 1.347 0.057 1.467 0.090 0.772 0.347 * 3.636 -0.008 -0.103 0.231
Pennsylvania 0.016 0.265 0.266 * 3.176 -0.015 -0.254 0.060 0.962 0.058 0.952 0.120
Rhode Island -0.090 -0.674 0.184 1.637 -0.122 -0.996 -0.071 -1.150 -0.207 * -2.824 -0.009
South Carolina 0.964 * 5.481 0.427 * 5.144 -0.005 -0.056 0.042 0.486 0.051 0.868 0.211
South Dakota 0.057 0.210 0.428 * 2.664 0.029 0.197 -0.028 -0.271 -0.273 * -7.199 0.179
Tennessee 0.382 * 3.903 0.407 * 4.028 -0.021 -0.286 0.146 * 2.568 0.154 * 2.541 0.227
Texas 0.138 * 4.658 0.379 * 6.636 0.002 0.033 0.121 * 1.655 -0.050 -1.132 0.130
Utah 0.262 1.430 -0.064 -0.636 0.322 * 1.653 -0.270 * -2.193 0.024 0.293 0.055
Vermont 0.198 1.161 0.080 0.704 0.271 * 1.891 0.459 * 3.146 -0.243 * -6.240 0.188
Virginia 0.468 * 3.756 0.208 * 4.262 0.105 1.124 -0.022 -0.326 0.129 1.395 0.109
Washington -0.099 -0.352 -0.145 -1.229 -0.246 -1.233 0.080 0.560 -0.132 -1.005 -0.048
West Virginia -0.442 * -4.862 0.109 1.135 -0.079 -0.596 0.108 * 1.796 -0.439 * -7.126 -0.014
Wisconsin 0.387 * 3.694 0.233 * 3.679 0.101 * 2.182 0.160 * 2.774 -0.079 -1.121 0.169
Wyoming 0.528 1.437 0.118 0.749 -0.472 * -3.075 -0.222 * -2.993 0.070 0.740 -0.040
US Total 0.157 0.152 -0.056 0.152 -0.027 0.078
* indicates statistical significance at the 10% level using White-corrected standard errors.31
Table 2. Effects of NAFTA on regional exports
a
Mexico Canada Europe Asia
Latin
America World
New England 0.118 0.160 -0.014 -0.050 -0.164 0.036
Mideast -0.060 0.155 -0.155 -0.016 -0.152 0.008
Great Lakes 0.224 0.057 -0.069 0.193 0.060 0.090
Plains 0.065 0.232 0.021 0.162 -0.083 0.145
Southeast 0.315 0.253 0.023 0.039 -0.008 0.091
South Central 0.186 0.386 -0.058 0.101 0.068 0.144
Southwest 0.144 0.307 0.018 0.190 -0.053 0.144
Rocky Mountain 0.155 0.053 0.108 0.113 -0.008 0.155
Far West 0.187 0.135 -0.085 0.247 -0.012 0.142
a  We use the BEA￿s regional classification, with their Southeast region split into the Southeast and the South
Central regions.  New England: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and
Vermont;  Mideast: Delaware, District of Columbia, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania;
Great Lakes: Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin;  Plains: Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri,
Nebraska, North Dakota, and South Dakota;  Southeast: Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Virginia, and West Virginia;  South Central: Alabama, Arkansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, and
Tennessee;  Southwest: Arizona, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas;  Rocky Mountain: Colorado, Idaho,
Montana, Utah, and Wyoming;  Far West: Alaska, California, Hawaii, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington.32
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Figure 7. The effects of NAFTA on states￿ exports to Asia36
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Figure 8. The effects of NAFTA on states￿ exports to
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Figure 9. The effects of NAFTA on states￿ exports to the world